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ABSTRACT 
The tal-corset movement, a beauty resistance campaign, swept South Korea’s feminist scene 
in 2018 and became a phenomenon bringing about unprecedented social changes in South 
Korea. This article explains sociocultural contexts to South Korea’s tal-corset movement 
through group interviews and examination of online materials. It documents the contempo-
rary history of the development of the movement from a feminist perspective. Findings show 
that movement participants see beauty practice as social oppression imposed on women’s 
bodies and appearances and the marker of women’s low social status. The new wave of an 
online feminist movement that emerged in 2015 created women-only communities that ena-
bled South Korean women to share their personal experiences as women and to reach the 
conclusion that in order to reject femininity and sexual objectification of women, they needed 
to take off the corset collectively. Awareness was manifested by encouraging other women to 
reject beauty practice and display their own tal-corset practice online and offline. This article 
argues that tal-corset movement is a feminist political movement that aims to eradicate femi-
ninity as social oppression. Female solidarity and connectedness played an essential role in 
forming the rationale and the tactics of the movement. 
KEYWORDS 
South Korea, beauty practice, feminist movement, tal-corset, Megalia, Womad, online move-
ment, femininity 
 
HE SO-CALLED TAL-CORSET MOVEMENT is a coined phrase referring to casting off 
feminized clothing, beauty practices, and conventions that swept South Korea’s 
feminist scene in 2018. Its contents have been covered by many overseas media 
outlets such as the BBC, CNN, and the New York Times, which describe the movement 
as “pushing back against beauty standards” (Jeong, 2019), “rejecting their country’s 
beauty ideals” (Kuhn, 2019) and “the simmering feminist revolution” (Edraki, 2019). 
The Korean word tal means “taking off (clothes)” or “breaking away from (some-
thing)” and corset represents sexist social customs, especially beauty practices, that 
are imposed on women. Participants in this movement usually cut their long hair 
short and stop wearing makeup and dresses, but degrees of participation vary de-
pending on the individual. There is no data on exactly how many women are partici-
pating in this movement. Still, according to one survey, 56.3 percent of South Korean 
women in their 20s support it (Korean Women’s Development Institute, 2018). The 
movement is bringing about many unprecedented social changes in South Korea. 
Year-on-year purchases of cosmetics, hair products, and other beauty products by 
South Korean women in their 20s significantly declined between 2016 and 2018. 
T 
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Expenditures on plastic surgery that had beforehand been consistently growing, de-
clined by 64.6 billion won ($58.3 USD). Instead of spending money on beauty prod-
ucts, young women were spending more money on cars after 2016 (G. Kim, 2019). 
There also emerged new clothing brands such as Fuse Seoul that focus on producing 
and selling items that are sold as genderless, quality clothing for women.  
The tal-corset movement can be characterized as a voluntary social movement not 
led by any specific organization or group that is mobilized online through various so-
cial networking platforms and online communities (Kuk et al., 2018). It is described 
as representing a newly emergent online feminist movement that has been building 
since 2015 in South Korea (Kim, 2019). This article explains sociocultural contexts to 
South Korea’s beauty resistance campaign and documents the contemporary history 
of the movement's development from a feminist perspective. This task follows re-
searchers who have traced the development of contemporary feminist initiatives such 
as the #MeToo movement and anti-rape protests (Jagsi, 2018; Boyle, 2019; Biswas, 
2018). 
This article will first provide theoretical contexts in terms of beauty practice and 
the social background of the tal-corset campaign—characteristics of beauty practice 
in South Korea and the social resources available for mobilizing the movement. Fol-
lowing the methodology, this study's findings will be discussed, focusing on the pur-
pose and the motivations of this movement.  
Theoretical and Research-Based Contexts of South Korea’s Tal-corset 
Movement 
Feminist analyses of beauty practices existed from when Mary Wollstonecraft 
said, “if artificial notions of beauty and false descriptions of sensibility have been early 
entangled with her motives of action, it cannot be expected that a woman will reso-
lutely endeavor to strengthen her constitution and abstain from enervating indul-
gences (Wollstonecraft, 1792/1988, p. 57).” Even more sophisticated critiques of 
beauty practices were produced during the second-wave feminist movement through 
consciousness-raising meetings when women discussed issues from their daily lives 
with other women (Sarachild, 1978; Bruley, 2013). Many feminists at that time saw 
beauty practices as sexist. This view was exercised at the Miss America Protest in 
1968 where women threw “instruments of female torture” such as bras, high heels, 
hair-curlers and corsets into a “freedom trash can,” as well as the Miss World demon-
stration in 1970 in the UK where women declared, “we are not beautiful, we are not 
ugly, we are angry” (Bruley, 2013, p. 721). Subsequently, feminist writers and scholars 
published critiques of beauty practices. Andrea Dworkin, for example, in her book 
Woman Hating (1974) agonized over western culture in which “not one part of a 
woman’s body is left untouched, unaltered” (Dworkin, 1974, p. 113). With an illustra-
tion of a female body under the title, “beauty hurts” she showed that every component 
of a woman’s body is modified through beauty practices. For example, hair is straight-
ened, eyebrows are plucked, nails are painted, and legs are shaved. Dworkin saw pain 
as “an essential part of the grooming process” and argued that, beginning in preado-
lescence, female socialization involves “the tolerance of pain” and, furthermore, that 
the “romanticization of that tolerance serves to prepare women for lives of childbear-
ing, self-abnegation, and husband-pleasing” (Dworkin, 1974, p.115).  
As Dworkin identified “the masochistic personalities generally found in adult 
woman,” Sandra Bartky grasped “the nature of feminine narcissism” as “infatuation 
with an interiorized body” (Bartky, 1990, p. 40). She linked feminine narcissism to 
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sexual objectification and asserted that the “fashion-beauty complex” interiorized this 
alienated representation of the self in women. For Bartky, this fashion-beauty com-
plex—a significant articulation of capitalist patriarchy—deepens “feminine anxiety 
which would accompany the status of sex-object” (Bartky, 1990, p. 41). Like sacra-
ments in churches, which used to cultivate women’s anxieties about their bodies, body 
care rituals “put a woman who would be lost and abandoned without them into what 
they may feel to her like a state of grace” (Bartky, 1990, p. 41). She warns that the 
satisfactions of narcissism are repressive satisfactions that come from “false needs” 
whose satisfaction benefits “a social order whose interest lies in domination” (Bartky, 
1990, p. 42).  
More recent criticism against beauty practices is found in Sheila Jeffreys’s book 
Beauty and Misogyny (2011). Jeffreys analyses today's invasive beauty practices such 
as breast implants, as well as persistent practices like high heels and makeup. She 
considers cosmetic surgeries a form of self-mutilation by women with low social sta-
tus and points out that these procedures have become normalized in recent decades. 
She claims that such continuum of western beauty practices, from lipstick at one end 
to invasive cosmetic surgery at the other, should be understood as “harmful cultural 
practices” that fit the United Nations criteria. She argues that they “create stereotyped 
roles for the sexes, that originate in the subordination of women and are for the ben-
efit of men, and they are justified by tradition” (Jeffreys, 2011, p. 39).  
The perspective from which beauty practice is viewed as oppressive means of im-
posing femininity to women as a social group is shared by contemporary beauty re-
sisters in South Korea. While these texts, which did not exist in Korean at the time the 
tal-corset movement emerged, did not necessarily directly influence its participants, 
their theorizing nonetheless reflected the kinds of discussions feminists were having 
online.  
Amongst feminists, different views of beauty practice exist. Some feminist writers 
consider beauty practice a matter of women’s choice or personal expression, instead 
of an oppression women experience in common (Scott, 2005). In an essay exploring 
third-wave feminism, R. Claire Snyder points out that even though “discussions of how 
the beauty industry negatively affects the self-image of women have been central to 
the third wave,” in the end, “the principle of choice” usually prevails. She offers an 
example of an author criticizing the body-shaping industry but still insisting that 
breast implants can be feminist in a case that a woman overcomes her insecurity 
about having small breasts by getting implants (Snyder, 2008, p. 189). As examined 
later in this article, this idea that beauty practice can be feminist based on choice or 
self-satisfaction was echoed in the debates in the early stages of the tal-corset move-
ment by women who defended women’s rights to choose beauty practice.  
Third-wave feminism’s non-judgmental attitude and emphasis on choice that 
“calls on feminism to engage with beauty and fashion in terms of playfulness and 
pleasure rather than coercion” (Elias et al., 2017, p. 21) often coincide with the char-
acteristics of power feminism or postfeminism. Naomi Wolf, who wrote The Beauty 
Myth (2002), adopted the term “power feminism” in her subsequent book Fire with 
Fire (1994) and encouraged women to “identify with one another primarily through 
the shared pleasures and strengths and femaleness” (Wolf, 1994, p. 72). Although this 
“affirmative turn” in the feminist discourse on beauty practice allows us to “think 
more ambivalently about beauty politics” and to “retain an openness to multiple pos-
sible readings” (Elias et al., 2017, p. 21), recent research on new technologies links to 
beauty practice stresses that beauty pressures have been intensified in the digital age. 
3
Park: Throwing off the Corset
Published by DigitalCommons@URI, 2020
 
 
In addition to the already pervasive, excessive sexualization of femininity, new 
technologies such as beauty apps on mobile phones have brought about digital self-
monitoring that puts women’s bodies under unprecedented degrees of scrutiny. In a 
study on beauty apps, Elias and Gill point out that the self-assessment practices con-
ducted through these apps constitute “the nano surveillance of visual appearance” 
(Alias & Gill, 2018, p. 74). These technological advances in beauty practice reflect to-
day’s reality, where women are encouraged to enhance their appearances through 
self-monitoring, discipline, and aggressive makeover to look pretty and successful. 
Although neoliberalism drives individuals—both men and women—to enhance self-
efficacy through endless competitions and self-disciplines, it is women who are “re-
quired to work on and transform the self to a much greater extent than men” (Gill & 
Scharff, 2011, p. 7). Digital media such as makeup tutorials and beauty vlogs are re-
producing “a conventional, idealized definition of beauty,” although their overt mes-
sage in most cases is self-empowerment (Banet-Weiser, 2017). These insights from 
feminist research on beauty practice are useful in understanding in what contexts to-
day’s South Korean women are performing beauty practice in terms of social expec-
tations and pressures.  
On the topic of South Korea’s tal-corset movement, there exists both a book and 
an academic article written in Korean that valuably describes the movement and its 
theoretical underpinnings. Minkyung Lee, in her recent book, Tal-corset: An Imagina-
tion That Has Arrived (2019), offered insights gained from interviews with 17 move-
ment participants. She stresses that the tal-corset movement is “the arena where fem-
inist knowledge accumulated since 2015 is deployed and generated” (Lee, 2019, p. 
391). She also posits that this movement is distinguished from the body positive 
movement that seeks inclusivity of appearances with all shapes and sizes because it 
does not pursue freedom of choice or diversity of beauty. Instead, she argues, this 
movement has been created through criticism against the trend of understanding 
body and appearance. She identifies the core purpose of this movement—escaping  
normative femininity imposed on women by quitting beauty practices. On the other 
hand, Aera Kim’s article on this movement takes the different view that the issue of 
sexist “additional expenses” lies at the heart of the movement. Kim, through online 
observation and interviews with seven individuals, posits that today’s young women 
must take on an unequal burden of spending more time and money on appearance 
than men. Tal-corset constitutes resistance to “becoming a woman” that “renders 
them disadvantaged in competition by making them spend more” (Kim, 2019, p. 66). 
She argues that this aspect made the movement possible and became the most im-
portant feminist agenda among young female participants because they are the gen-
eration who must compete with men to get ahead and get desired jobs. These two 
quite contradictory arguments need to be examined further. I intend to focus on the 
formation process of the basic understandings of the movement by conducting group 
interviews and analyzing relevant literature and online data. 
Social Background of the Tal-corset Movement 
Societal pressures on women’s bodies and appearances are universally witnessed 
around the world. Still, South Korea is particularly well known for its meticulous, 
high-end beauty regimens—represented in the famous “10-step Korean skincare reg-
imen” (Rekstis, 2016)—and advanced technologies of cosmetic surgeries, being 
called “the plastic surgery capital” in one article. The term K-beauty came into public 
use within the last 10 years, referring to “Korea’s global influence on aesthetics and 
cosmetics (Kim, 2016).” K-beauty is associated with the Hallyu (Korean Wave), the 
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global popularity of South Korean culture, and has resulted in a drastic increase in the 
export of Korean beauty products to other Asian countries and the west and a boom 
in plastic surgery tourism to Korea. The beauty industry's growth signifies the in-
crease in social pressure on women’s appearances in Korea, which seems contradic-
tory to the rise of women’s enhanced access to higher education and the job market. 
Statistics show that 31% of South Korean women in their 20s have gone through plas-
tic surgeries (Gallup Korea, 2015). Against this sociocultural backdrop, the tal-corset 
movement emerged with the new wave of an online feminist movement formed in 
2015. 
To understand the context of this new form of activism, we need to look into South 
Korea’s digital environment. According to research, South Korea has the fastest Inter-
net connection speed and the highest internet penetration rate of 96 percent, being 
cited as “the most heavily connected society.” Research shows that 89% of young 
adults check their social media accounts at least once per day, and women check even 
more frequently (Pew Research Center, 2018). When South Koreans mostly rely on 
the internet for information and interaction, it is no wonder that women started build-
ing their own online space to avoid misogynistic culture reported to be embedded in 
cyberspace. According to researches on female-centered online spaces in Korea, 
“women increasingly established female-oriented online communities based on their 
shared interests and to avoid the discomfort of being a woman in male-dominated 
communities” (Jeong & Lee, 2018, p. 707). These communities were not explicitly 
feminist, but they became “a milieu where feminist ideas and discourses circulate and 
proliferate,” particularly after the emergence of Megalia.  
During the MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus) epidemic in 
2015, a news article circulated online, reporting two Korean women spread the virus 
by refusing to take the test after visiting Hong Kong. This news enraged Korean men 
who soon poured out misogynistic speech online about these two women, but the 
news turned out to be false. This irrational but ancient women-blaming behavior of 
men brought groups of women to a MERS forum on the DC Inside website to express 
their anger towards men. Women shortly afterwards setup an independent website 
called Megalia, a term that combined the word MERS and Egalia from a feminist novel 
Egalia’s Daughters (1985). Megalia brought about an explosive, enthusiastic response 
from young Korean women, which made it a notable social phenomenon and marked 
the emergence of a new online feminist movement. Their signature tactic was paro-
dying called mirroring, through which “they copy the misogynistic language but re-
verse the positions of perpetrators and victims in the original” (Jeong & Lee, 2018, p. 
708). This online feminist movement soon expanded to offline world as shown in the 
case of B-Wave protests for abortion rights (B stands for the dress code of rally par-
ticipants that stresses the demise of human rights of women) and The Courage to Be 
Uncomfortable rallies against illicit filming of women in public places and private sex-
ual encounters, which brought thousands of women onto the street in an unprece-
dented scale in Korea’s history. Most participants in the tal-corset movement are 
known to be supportive of or participating in marriage resistance campaign as well. 
This campaign involves pledges to resist marriage and its heterosexual imperatives 
like sex and pregnancy. 
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This study’s research methods are two-fold. First, three group interviews of the 
movement participants were conducted. Research on social movements often adopts 
group interviews (Brimacombe et al., 2018; Yannopoulou et al., 2019), and I chose to 
do group interviews because this movement was created through copious online dis-
cussions among women. I expected group interviews to facilitate the exchange of dif-
ferent experiences and ideas, making the movement's dominant themes emerge. 
Eighteen women ranging from age 20 to 42 participated in the group interviews. I 
used my connections as a feminist activist to recruit interviewees and obtain recom-
mendations from others, mostly from a radical feminist press called Yeolda Books. 
The first group of participants was selected through purposive sampling to recruit 
women with various backgrounds such as age and occupation. The second group con-
sisted of women working for the aforementioned feminist press, and the third one 
comprises members of a radical feminist group in a women’s university in Seoul. In-
terviews were conducted in Seoul and Incheon between January and February in 
2020. Group interviews were loosely structured around the following questions: (a) 
what is understood as corset?; (b) what is the purpose of the movement?; (c) what 
motivated women to participate in the movement? Group discussions were audio-rec-
orded, transcribed, and analyzed for the main themes that surfaced. 
Secondly, online materials regarding the tal-corset movement on YouTube were 
examined. YouTube has been an important platform where ideas on the tal-corset 
movement are shared and discussed. Aera Kim pointed out, through her observation, 
that most-viewed YouTube videos on feminism were about the tal-corset movement 
and, unlike Twitter or Instagram where it is difficult to share lengthy texts, YouTube 
offered a space where women could talk about the purposes or methods of the move-
ment in detail (Kim, A., 2019, p. 49). This research focused on analyzing contents of 
the videos that dealt with issues, in particular, the ones debated around the key pur-
pose and nature of the movement—for example, whether the movement is about re-
jecting femininity or being more comfortable with one’s own body, and whether 
beauty practice can be feminist.    
The Development Process of the Movement: From Online Discussion to Real-
Life Actions 
The tal-corset movement first started through women analyzing what the corset 
comprises. The word corset was adopted to examine patriarchal, oppressive socio-
cultural norms in the beginning stage of Megalia in 2015. For example, in late 2015, 
there was an online campaign by Megalians called the Corset Awareness Project. 
Women created online materials about the corset based on their discussions in the 
Megalia community and shared these texts and images on SNS platforms such as Fa-
cebook (Kim, I. et al., 2018, p. 6). These materials were intended to raise women’s 
awareness of the sexist nature of certain practices such as waxing, dieting, and 
makeup. Discussions on the corset continued throughout 2016, but when it came to 
whether to actually “take it off,” women’s opinions varied. Some argued that no one 
should tell women what to do or not to do, or that women can, in some cases, do 
beauty practice for self-satisfaction. Some women defended untraditional makeup ap-
plications, such as bold Smokey eye-makeup, by some women as a rebellious act 
against social norms that dictate women to look docile. Ri-Na Kim, who documented 
and analyzed this debate in an article, sees this as a group process of coming to a con-
sensus that meanings of individuals’ practices should be interpreted in the context of 
social structure and its influences (Kim, R., 2018, p.98). Women stressed that wearing 
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makeup originates from women’s low social status and powerlessness in a patriarchal 
society, some saying that in equal societies, today’s makeup would be regarded as 
film-like special effects because women would be no longer expected to put on 
makeup. In 2017 at Womad, the most radical women-only online community derived 
from Megalia, discussions on how to take off the corset started in earnest. The website 
soon banned its members from uploading posts displaying them wearing corset and 
sent postings that contained members’ experiences of tal-corset to a special bulletin 
board that listed the most popular postings. In this stage, some women started post-
ing their tal-corset experiences on Twitter with tips on how to get a proper haircut 
and so forth. Womad and Twitter were both anonymity-based social platforms, and 
women posted this Tal-corset Injeung in which they showed proof of having taken off 
the corset without fully disclosing their faces—for example, posting a picture of 
smashed, destroyed makeup tools or their short hair in profile. (See Figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of tal-corset Injeung posting on Instagram with a before-
and-after picture with the hashtag tal-corset. This person explained in her 
posting that she overcame her eating disorder after practicing tal-corset. (The 
woman’s face in the photo was blurred by the author.) 
B-Wave protest for abortion rights organized by Womad and other women’s 
online communities, which started in late 2016 and continued until 2019 when the 
abortion ban was lifted through a Constitutional Court ruling, was the main space out-
side the cyberworld at the time where women can meet other women who have taken 
off the corset face to face. On Facebook, a platform with a lower level of anonymity 
than Twitter, tal-corset Injeung also started in late 2017 with a similar pattern to that 
occurring via Twitter. 
Then, in May 2018, South Korea witnessed the largest women’s rally against male 
violence named The Courage to Be Uncomfortable. Spy-cam had already been a seri-
ous issue in South Korea. There had been reports on spy-cam videos and pictures be-
ing illegally posted online. Women had made complaints numerous times, failing to 
solicit serious actions from the government or the police. However, when a woman 
illegally filmed a male nude model, the police swiftly took action and arrested her. This 
double standard of the police investigation enraged women who had witnessed police 
inaction in cases with female victims over the years. In response, anonymous women 
organized a rally against the crimes of secret filming. The first rally—to the surprise 
of the public, the police, and the organizing team—brought 12,000 women to Seoul's 
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streets. Afterward, this women-only rally was held almost every month, ending in De-
cember at the sixth rally with 350,000 accumulated participants in total. Chartered 
buses arrived at the rally with women from the southern half of the Korean peninsula. 
The women-only policy was so strict that even male reporters were not allowed inside 
the rally barricades (Kuk et al., 2018). The sheer number of participants and the fact 
that it was organized entirely by anonymous, average women online shocked the na-
tion.  
These rallies in 2018 offered young Korean women, who in general became femi-
nists after the emergence of the online discussion group Megalia, an opportunity to 
gather and express their anger towards patriarchal society and meet like-minded fem-
inists face to face. Many women confessed they were surprised and deeply impressed 
to see in-person women who had taken off the corset. The rally had the head-shave 
performance in which women got their heads shaved on stage and gave speeches on 
their thoughts on the corset and male violence. As the rallies progressed in 2018, 
more women started showing up to the protests with short hair and no makeup. 
Around this time, YouTube channels about the tal-corset movement started to appear 
and became very popular, with their subscribers rapidly accumulating day by day. For 
example, Jiwon Cha uploaded her video titled A day of a Korean woman/Vlog (feat. 
Tal-corset) on 25th May 2018, and it became an instant hit. In the video, she showed 
her simplified morning routines, especially with shortened time to get ready. Another 
YouTuber, Lina Bae, who used to run a beauty tutorial channel on YouTube, posted a 
video called I’m not pretty in June, which got eight million views. Bae showed her pro-
cess of ripping off fake eyelashes and wiping off her makeup with subtitles appearing, 
in turn displaying the comments people make on women’s appearance—some com-
plimentary and some judging. At the end of the video, Bae smiles with her naked face, 
saying “I am not pretty, but it is okay.” Many women said they cried watching this 
video, and one of the interviewees for this study echoed the sentiment. The emer-
gence of YouTube channels on tal-corset is especially significant because contrary to 
the tal-corset Injeung postings on Womad or Twitter, YouTubers openly, and more 
confidently, started speaking about the tal-corset movement, exposing their faces and 
lives outside of the computer. In the same period, tal-corset Injeung postings on In-
stagram increased rapidly. Considering that Instagram is known to focus on sharing 
users’ photos and videos, this phenomenon also shows that more women started 
practicing tal-corset in their real life and became more confident sharing others' ex-
perience. Interviewees said they witnessed increases in tal-corset Injeung postings 
on Instagram as one “saw sudden rise in feminist postings on Instagram around the 
time spy-cam rallies went on. Hashtags on tal-corset started circulating on Instagram, 
and then more women plucked up the courage seeing these Injeung pictures online.” 
The tal-corset movement was no longer an online campaign with limited numbers of 
anonymous women participating. It was now a social phenomenon and gained sub-
stantial media attention nationwide and overseas. 
The Purpose of the Movement: Rejecting Femininity 
Practicing tal-corset usually means casting-off makeup, long hair, and feminine 
clothes such as skirts and skinny jeans. Movement participants say that beauty prac-
tices are a marker of women’s inferior social status and the mechanism that renders 
women dolls—turning women into things and commodities—and serves women's 
sexual objectification (SOLOdarity, 2019). Tal-corset differs from the body positive 
movement in this vein. Body positivity aims to “challenge the narrow appearance ide-
als and instead represent a diverse array of bodies of different shapes, sizes, colours, 
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features, and abilities, with the presumed aim of fostering body acceptance and ap-
preciation” (Cohen et al. 2019, p. 548) While body positive movement advocates ac-
ceptance of any appearances and mainly focuses on removing fat-shaming, the tal-
corset campaign refuses feminized appearance. Although refusal of femininity is the 
bottom line of the tal-corset movement, sometimes other aspects of the campaign are 
seen as more prominent on social media—advantages of practicing tal-corset: the 
convenience of wearing comfortable clothes; being able to save money by not buying 
beauty products; and having more spare time to pursue personal development. 
From the interviews undertaken for this research, women indicated two reasons 
for this tendency to emphasize non-political benefits of tal-corset. First, it is easier to 
talk to other women into practicing tal-corset when they emphasize personal ad-
vantages to gain from it than stressing the movement's social cause. Interviewees 
talked about this point as one of them said, “I think the purpose always remained the 
same as escaping sexual objectification. We just kept saying tal-corset is convenient 
because it’s an easier way to talk other women into trying it.” Secondly, many women 
confess online their realization that they get to see things differently once they “take 
off the corset.” It occurs to them that they used to spend a lot of time and money to 
look pretty and benign activities such as a trip become very different when women do 
not pack beauty products in their luggage and do not spend much time on taking a 
perfect picture with perfect outfits and makeup to post on their social media (Heavy 
Talker, 2019). Women have been sharing online their newly gained insights on the 
disadvantages of beauty practices, and this in turn, has functioned as a motivation for 
other women to try tal-corset.  
From these responses of research participants, one might wonder whether the 
nature and purpose of the movement were misunderstood when the beneficial as-
pects of tal-corset were emphasized, instead of the feminist, political cause, to moti-
vate women to participate. For this reason, presumably, influential tal-corset YouTu-
bers started posting videos in 2018, explaining the real reason why women should 
take off the corset when a flood of new women started trying tal-corset. For instance, 
in one of the most viewed tal-corset videos posted in November 2018, Heavy Talker, 
a team of two women, say, “Since we say that tal-corset makes you feel more comfort-
able with yourself, some say they already feel comfortable wearing long hair and long 
skirts.” They stress that “people need to understand that ‘being comfortable’ is not the 
primary motivator of tal-corset” and “tal-corset is about demolishing the norms of 
femininity socially imposed on women.” In June 2019, a similar video by the team SO-
LOdarity was uploaded in which they stated tal-corset was not about being comfort-
able: 
Some misunderstand tal-corset as something you do to feel more comforta-
ble, say they are comfortable with long skirts and complain that short hair 
makes you go to hair salons more often. It is true that tal-corset comes with 
some inconveniences. When your hair is short, you might have to get a haircut 
more frequently, and you might need to buy a whole new wardrobe for tal-
corset. Nevertheless, we practice tal-corset because it is not about being 
more comfortable. It is about not being a doll, a second-class citizen. The ben-
efits of tal-corset—convenience, financial advantages from not buying corset 
products, and enhanced quality of life—are just secondary gains. We’d like 
you to understand that we do not practice tal-corset for these benefits (SO-
LOdarity, 2019).  
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In addition to feminist social influencers’ efforts to promote the real driver of the 
movement, another factor contributes to maintaining the social cause of the cam-
paign. Women say that they see how bizarre beauty practices are with fresh eyes after 
taking off the corset. One interviewee of this study talked about her experience in 
which her mother applied lipstick on her lips after she cut her hair short: “You look 
very strange when you put on lipstick with buzz-cut hair.” Another woman who had 
applied to a Japanese university bought a long-haired wig because she heard it was 
customary for Japanese female students to wear a skirt and heels with neatly tied hair 
for college interviews. She says:  
but when I saw myself reflected in the mirror wearing the wig, it was unbear-
able. I thought I’d rather die than wear the wig. So, I decided to take a risk 
and went to the interview wearing a men’s suit. I got admitted, fortunately.  
She was a self-described makeup enthusiast before taking off the corset. These 
new perspectives they gained from taking off the corset transformed how they saw 
the performance of femininity.  
Many movement participants describe the state of corset-free as a default, mean-
ing “the state of not performing femininity as it is socially imposed,” according to 
Heavy Talker. Originally referring to a standard-setting in terms of computer software, 
the word default is widely used in the movement, sometimes combined with other 
words, for example, default-person, default-look, and default-trip, which means a trip 
free of beauty practices. Minkyung Lee explains in her book that this term contains “a 
political determination to make a human form expected for women a state that no 
longer needs additional labor, as in the case of men” (Lee, 2019, p. 43). This pursuit 
of default state manifests in expressions women use such as protein hijab, meaning 
long hair, and 여장하다 feminise oneself, which is used when a woman wears makeup 
or feminine clothes. 
At a head-shaving performance at one of the women-only rallies against spy-cam 
filming in 2018, a woman talked about her thoughts regarding this matter. “Sisters, 
we’re not a longhair breed born with long hair. The question should be why we keep 
this inconvenient long hair, not why we cut our hair short” (Official YouTube Channel 
of the Courage to Be Comfortable, 2018). To these women, beauty practices are not 
natural or a real choice. Instead, they are something that makes women put up with 
the inconvenience. Through this analysis, women stress the societal aspect of beauty 
practices rather than individual choice. One woman who posted a comment under a 
YouTube video on the tal-corset points out that “Girls Can Do Anything” discourse is 
sometimes used to justify the argument that beauty practice can be a feminist choice:  
The preferences of individual women cannot justify misogyny. Feminism ex-
ists in political, social arena, not personal healing. (…) Corset is the marker 
of second-class citizenship, but some people are using ‘Girls Can Do Anything’ 
to justify this. Feminism is about women’s liberation and the abolition of pa-
triarchy. It is not a movement to just promote women’s happiness and needs.  
These arguments show that the tal-corset movement has developed through counter-
acting choice discourse on beauty practice that stresses individual choice and self-
satisfaction by emphasizing social influences on beauty practices and its effects in 
sustaining patriarchy. 
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Displaying Oneself to Inspire Other Women To Take Off the Corset 
In the interviews with movement participants, women’s motivations for partici-
pating in the tal-corset movement were discussed, along with the meaning of female 
solidarity in respect of them. The tal-corset movement can seem like an individualistic 
protest because it involves changing participants’ personal lives by casting off daily 
beauty practices. However, as examined earlier, the process of producing arguments 
for tal-corset was a collective one. In many cases, the practice of tal-corset is moti-
vated by connecting one’s beauty practices with the experiences of other women. 
Online discussions on the corset made women realize that their beauty practices can 
reinforce other women’s beauty practices—commonly expressed as “tightening oth-
ers’ corsets.” This insight resonates with Alison Winch’s term girlfriend gaze through 
which women and girls monitor each other’s appearances and behaviors (Winch, 
2013, p. 17). Winch argues the “mutual body regulation” among women is intensified 
through digital media where “the many girlfriends watch the many girlfriends” (p. 
21). One interviewee in this study expressed this insight, saying that she realized that 
before taking off the corset, she was “walking around with a signboard attached to her 
body which said a woman is a thing to be made up and seen.” This realization made 
women acutely aware of the effect of their beauty practice on young girls. Five women 
among my 18 interviewees said that they decided to take off their corset when they 
realized their own beauty practices influenced younger women’s perceptions and 
beauty practices. For instance, one interviewee said: 
I was working at an elementary school library, and I knew about the tal-cor-
set movement, but I wasn’t brave enough to actually do it. I didn’t wear much 
makeup at that time, but I always put on lipstick—pink  or red. One day, this 
10-year-old girl at school said to me ‘your lips look very pretty today.’ I was 
shocked and said (waving her hands), ‘no, no. this is not pretty.’ It suddenly 
occurred to me that these little girls noticed these things. The next day I cut 
my hair short and have never worn lipstick since.  
A tal-corset YouTuber also says she took off her corset after seeing a group of high 
school girls putting on makeup at a restaurant table (Heavy Talker, 2018). It is said 
that wearing makeup is becoming normal among teenage girls, causing girls without 
makeup to wear masks to hide their naked faces. In a survey, 48% of Korean teenage 
women were considering having plastic surgery (MezzoMedia, 2019). The main chan-
nel through which teenagers get beauty tips was YouTube (49%). Lina Bae, a famous 
tal-corset YouTuber who previously ran a beauty tutorial channel, says in an article 
that although she knew about the arguments of tal-corset, it was the comments of 
little girls, saying watching her videos made them want to put on makeup, that gave 
her the final push to throw off the corset and start creating content on tal-corset (Ste-
venson, 2018). Women began recognizing their role in reinforcing beauty practices or 
encouraging tal-corset among other women. This awakening is why some online 
women-only communities—Womad—and student forums of women’s universities 
such as Ewha and Sungshin, for example—forbade members from posting pictures or 
comments that contain displays of corsets.  
The awareness of their own role in reinforcing beauty norms on other women led 
to the idea that they can also inspire others to free themselves from the oppression of 
beauty by displaying and sharing their tal-corset experiences. This illustration dis-
tributed online describes the process of spreading tal-corset messages through 
women practicing it themselves (See Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: An illustration of the social contagion effect of tal-corset by Suin Choi 
Interviewees expressed how the online Injeung culture affected their practice of 
tal-corset and why they chose to post the Injeung pictures of themselves on social 
media. Some did the Injeung to impress other feminists in online feminist communi-
ties, and others did it to encourage other women to try tal-corset. One of the inter-
viewees posted a picture of her long hair cut off on Facebook and was told later by a 
woman that she wanted to do the same after seeing the photo online, and she cut her 
hair short soon after. The spread of Injeung postings online among young women also 
made the tal-corset movement look “hip and trendy.”    
However, the most effective way of influencing other women to take of the corset 
was offline gatherings. Seventeen out of 18 interviewees participated in at least one 
series of women-only rallies against spy-cam filming in 2018. They said that seeing 
masses of women free from the corset had a considerable impact on their practice of 
tal-corset. For instance, one of the interviewees had attended the first rally held in 
May, where there were some tal-corset women, but they were not the majority. Her 
second rally was the fourth one held in August, and she was surprised to see the in-
creased number of women with short hair. She thought to herself: “There are actually 
many women who cut their hair short, and it is okay to live with short hair. Then, why 
can’t I do that, too?” The power of meeting with women practicing tal-corset was 
demonstrated in cases where women confessed online that they took off their corset 
after attending one of the rallies. One woman who identified herself as an Instagram 
star talked about her experience online: 
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To be honest, I wore a tight off-the-shoulder top and hot pants on purpose to 
the rally. It had been just a month since I’d become a feminist, and people 
always say that only ugly, fat women become feminists, so I wanted to show 
the world that wasn’t true. But after participating in the rally, I had a chance 
to think more deeply about corset ideas, and I suddenly felt ashamed of my-
self and sorry for my sisters. I’m worried that sisters might have felt discour-
aged in taking off their corsets because of me or felt angry or disappointed in 
me. I am very sorry. The fact that I thought I was being cool by being a 
‘dressed-up’ feminist now embarrasses me. You know, I used to be an Insta-
gram star posting beauty tips, but when I look through those pictures of me 
now, I look like a ridiculous doll on a shelf and it even feels disgusting to see 
the way I look in degrading poses and stupid dresses and makeup. If we have 
another rally soon, I will put on a comfortable t-shirt and pants, I swear. I am 
grateful for everyone who cut their hair short and said women are human 
and don’t have to look pretty (quoted from an article by Kuk, J et al. 2018). 
One interviewee, a student of a women’s university, was taking a women’s studies 
course at the time that consisted of about eighty students. At the beginning of the 
course, only one or two women had short hair, but at the end of the semester in late 
June, she witnessed about twenty women had short hair. The professor asked the stu-
dents if they cut their hair short for the tal-corset movement, and the students said 
yes.  
The anti-spy-cam rallies that gave momentum to the tal-corset movement started 
having head-shaving performances on stage from the time of the second rally. In South 
Korea, head-shaving has been a symbol of demonstrating resolution for social causes, 
but this time, it had another meaning, as shown through the performance partici-
pants' speeches. In speeches they gave while having their heads shaven, women said 
they “refused to be sexually objectified as a woman.”  
I used to like looking pretty, but the society treated me like a doll, not a hu-
man. I’m not a princess. It is okay to have short hair. It is okay not being pretty. 
Today I came here to display my hair cut short to be a human. Please do not 
objectify or thingify me and my sisters (Official YouTube Channel of the Cour-
age to be Uncomfortable, 2018). 
Tal-corset was linked to a campaign against male violence in that women, in both 
movements, seek to be respected as humans, not sexual objects. The tal-corset move-
ment was understood by movement participants as a collective resistance against 
beauty practices, which arise from society’s sexual objectification of women. They 
recognized the influence their beauty practices had on other women and saw beauty 
practices as oppressing all women. 
Conclusion 
Women-only online communities such as Megalia and Womad provided Korean 
women with space where they could share their common experiences of oppression 
regarding their bodies and appearance. Through debates and discussions among 
women on what constitutes the corset, women countered the argument that beauty 
practices are an individual woman’s choice and can be feminist. In response, they 
stressed the social aspects and impacts of beauty practices and posited that it origi-
nates from women’s low social status and powerlessness in a patriarchal society. 
Their understanding of femininity as the marker of women’s inferior status and the 
mechanism used to sexually objectify women propelled women to reject beauty 
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practices all together. Total rejection of femininity, especially in terms of appearance, 
as the tal-corset movement’s aim is the characteristic that distinguishes the move-
ment from the body positive movement that promotes acceptance of any appearances. 
“The personal is political,” the slogan of the second-wave feminist movement, was 
echoed throughout the online discussions on what constitutes the corset. Although 
the emphasis of the personal benefits of the tal-corset practice such as saved time and 
money invited counter-argument that certain beauty practices were more convenient 
or comfortable, new insights gained from practicing tal-corset in real life made dis-
cussions on the corset richer, leading to the invention of new terms such as protein 
hijab which means women’s long hair.      
Women’s analysis that their beauty practices can reinforce other women’s—ex-
pressed as “tightening other’s corset”—also offered a rationale for the need to resist 
beauty practices collectively. The intensified pressures on the younger generation’s 
beauty practice were especially stressed as the reason to stop reinforcing the beauty 
norms, through the themes of female solidarity. The main tactic to spread tal-corset 
was displaying oneself through online Injeung culture where women posted pictures 
of their tal-corset practices on social media, such as pictures of destroyed makeup 
tools or short hair. This tactic was intended to inspire other women to be free from 
the corset and was effective in reaching out to average women on social media 
through hashtags. This tactic can be understood as a unique example of counteracting 
mutual body regulation among females by collectively displaying the practice of tak-
ing off the corset. The women-only rallies in 2018 offered physical space where 
women could actually see other women who had taken off the corset in real life, and 
meeting beauty resisters in person encouraged women to be more brave and confi-
dent to try tal-corset. As women experience what it is like to live free of the corset 
their newly gained insights on how beauty practices oppress women are being ac-
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